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The End of the Electorate of Hannover by N. Ludlow Beamish |
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Volume I • Chapter III
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Field Marshal Count Wallmoden Gimborn The same day on which the convention was signed at Suhlingen, but before its details were known in Hanover, marshal Wallmoden left the latter place for Celle, to take command of the army. In the afternoon of the following day he was joined by colonel von Bock, who delivered to him a copy of the first five and seventeenth articles of the convention. As these six articles contained all that had any direct reference to the military, it was, perhaps, not material that the remaining ones should be immediately communicated to marshal Wallmoden; but allowing him to remain ignorant of the condition added by general Mortier - to proceed with the fulfilment of the convention, uninformed of a clause which completely suspended its validity, was a most unpardonable and altogether unaccountable omission on the part of lieutenant-colonel von Bock, and one which, if it did not absolutely cause the disasters with which the Hanoverian army were soon after overwhelmed, materially hastened their approach. In the full conviction that a valid document, equally binding upon the two contracting parties, had been signed at Suhlingen, Wallmoden proceeded to comply with the conditions which it imposed upon his army. The artillery was given up to French commissaries; orders for the immediate surrender of Hameln were sent to the officer who commanded that fortress; and so scrupulously, both in spirit and in letter; was this convention fulfilled on the part of the Hanoverian government, that the military stores of Stade and Harburg, which, agreeably to orders given before, but executed after, the signing of the convention, had absolutely arrived in Lauenburg, were, on the reclamation of general Frere, returned to the arsenals from whence they had been removed, and the pontoons, on a like demand of general Mortier, were also given up to the French. Thus deprived of their artillery and pontoons, the stores of two arsenals, and their only fortress, the Hanoverian troops proceeded to comply with that article which stipulated that they should retire behind the Elbe. Their route lay through the town of Lüneburg, and over a great part of that vast uncultivated country which bears its name (The Lüneburgher Haide (Lüneburgh Heath), which, with the exception of the province of Meppen, is the most desolate part of the Hanoverian dominions.). Here, where money could scarcely supply the wants of an individual traveller, provisions and quarters for fifteen thousand souls, and from eight to nine thousand horses, were immediately required. The new formed magazines could not be made available to this purpose, for they had been established on the Weser and Aller, and both time and means of transport for their conveyance were wanting; the French, also, laid claim to these stores under the authority of the convention; the commissariat were, therefore, obliged to depend upon whatever corn and forage the individual amts in the vicinity of the line of march might have at hand, and their own personal exertions in forming magazines wherever it was possible to collect supplies. In a desolate and unfruitful country, this operation would, under the most favourable circumstances, have been attended with difficulty; but when to the naturally ungenial soil, was added the discontent and disaffection of its possessors, the increase of impediment may well be imagined. Such a feeling had now arisen in the district of Lüneburg. A confused association of the idea, "arrival of the French," with that of "subversion of all order an civil government," pervaded the minds of the country people; an insurrectionary spirit was in many places openly exhibited, and the magistrates saw their orders derided, and their personal safety endangered. Abandoned, as a great part of the peasantry believed themselves to be by the army, they no longer acknowledged its claims upon their resources, and upon the only means which they possessed of supplying their own wants, and appeasing the expected demands of a rapacious enemy. For these reasons it was that whole amt-districts not only refused delivering to the commissariat the supplies which they had at hand, and for which they were offered immediate and liberal payment, but in some places took forcible possession, and prevented the distribution, of those stores which had been already collected for the use of the troops. (Some of the Lüneburgher Bauers are said to have accompanied their resistance to the requisitions, which were made upon them, with the following naif observation, "Sie wüssten ja nicht ob Bonaparte es haben wolle." You don’t know but Bonaparte may want it!) In such cases no alternative remained but to retake the articles in a similar manner, and thus it became necessary to resort to extremes, rarely called for but in an enemy’s country. The difficulties under which the commissariat laboured, were also much increased by the obligation which was imposed on them at the same time to provide for the wants of the army during its march, and to prepare for its reception and abode in Lauenburg. The necessity for this double duty naturally divided their labours, and prevented the troops from immediately experiencing the full benefit of the arrangements that were made; however, the indefatigable zeal of the several officers of this department, and particularly the able and quickly concerted measures of commercial counsellor Heise, prevented either men or horses from suffering any material privation during the whole of the march. But the cause and general nature of this movement towards the Elbe was too humiliating to the feelings of a brave and loyal soldiery not to be productive of the most injurious effects upon their discipline, and desertion became frequent. Believing that the country was lost, knowing that it had been abandoned to the enemy without a struggle, and finding themselves reduced to a state of neutrality, many fancied that they were justified in throwing off their allegiance, and escaping from those duties which seemed so little likely to be attended with credit to themselves or benefit to the country. According to a preliminary understanding with the French commander, the space of ten days was to be allowed for the troops to effect their passage of the Elbe; but so desirous was Mortier to gain possession of his easy conquest, that before half that period had elapsed, French detachments appeared on the Hanoverian line of march, and the town of Lüneburg was, on the same night, occupied by the troops of both armies. To such a collision, under all the irritating circumstances connected with their retreat, it was desirable that the Hanoverians should not be exposed; the march, therefore, was precipitated, and its difficulties were consequently increased. The Elbe was to be crossed at three different points, to which the several regiments now hurried; but although the greater part of an enormous baggage-train had been shipped at Lüneburg, and from thence conveyed down the Ilmenau to the right bank of the Elbe, the passage of that river was not effected in less than five days, and even then several regiments had not yet reached the army. On the 9th of June, marshal Wallmoden established his head-quarters in the town of Lauenburg, and immediately proceeded to make a suitable disposition of his troops. On the 13th, lieutenant colonel von Bock, who had returned to Hanover for the purpose of superintending all minor details connected with the military, transmitted to him a complete copy of the convention of Suhlingen; and this communication, which reached Wallmoden on the 14th, first informed him of the clause with which Mortier had qualified his ratification of that document. On the 15th of June, the French general informed colonel Bock that he had that day received the first consul’s ratification of the convention of Suhlingen, on the condition that it were also ratified by the king of England, to whom, for that purpose, it had been sent. This portentous intelligence, which was immediately communicated to marshal Wallmoden, gave rise to the most painful apprehensions in the mind of that general, who clearly saw, in this specious conduct of Napoleon, an attempt to invalidate a convention, on the faith of which his army were already in possession of all the advantages which, under its authority, they were entitled to claim. The first consul’s conditional assent was communicated by M. de Talleyrand to lord Hawkesbury in the following terms: "MILORD, Après un léger engagement avec les troupes de S.M. brittannique, l’armée française occupe le pays d’Hanovre. "Le premier consul n’ayant eu en vue que d’obtenir des gages pour l’évacuation de Malte, et de travailler à accomplir l’exécution du traité d’Amiens, n’a point voulu faire éprouver toutes les rigueurs de la guerre aux sujets de S.M. brittanique. Cependant, le premier consul ne peut ratifier la convention conclue entre l’armée française et celle de S.M., dont j’ai l’honneur de joindre ici copie, qu’autant qu’elle sera pareillement ratifiée par S.M. brittanique, et dans ce cas le premier consul me charge expressément de déclarer qu’il est dans son intention que l’armée du roi d’Angleterre en Hanovre soit d’abord echangée contre tous les matelots ou soldats que les vaisseaux de S.M. ont fait ou sont dans le cas de faire prisonniers. "Le premier consul verrait avec peine que S.M. brittanique, en refusant de ratifier la dite convention, obligeât le gouvernement français a traiter le pays d’Hanovre avec toute la rigeur de la guerre, et comme un pays qui, livré a lui-même, abandonné par son souvrain, se serait trouvé conquis sans capitulation, et laissé à la discretion de la puissance occupante. "J’attendrai avec empressement, milord, que vous me fassiez connaître les intentions de S.M. brittanique. "Recevez, milord, l’assurance de ma plus haute consideration. (Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND." When this letter reached London, transports for the conveyance of the Hanoverian army to England lay ready at the Nore, and were to have sailed for the Elbe on the 13th or 14th inst., but anxious as was the king that their destination should be fulfilled, and indignant as the paternal monarch could not but feel on being informed of the humiliating conditions to which his brave Hanoverian troops had been subjected, his majesty was led to believe that a faithful observance of the terms of the convention would, however justifiably they might be resisted, now best serve the general interests of the electorate; the sailing of the transports was consequently countermanded, and the following reply to the communication of M. de Talleyrand despatched by his majesty’s commands on the 15th inst. Downing-street, June 15th. "SIR, I have laid before the king your letter of the 10th instant. "I am commanded by his majesty to inform you that as he has always considered his character of elector of Hanover as distinct from his character of king of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland he never can consent to acquiesce in any proceeding by which he shall sanction the idea that he is liable in justice to be attacked in the one capacity, for the line of conduct which he may have felt it to have been his duty to adopt in the other. "This principle is not advanced for the first time; it has been recognized by most of the powers of Europe, and by none more particularly than by the French government, who, in the year 1795, in consequence of his having acceded to the treaty of Basle, acknowledged the neutrality of his majesty in his capacity of elector of Hanover, at a time when they were engaged in a war with him as king of Great Britain. "It has been further confirmed by the conduct of his majesty on the occasion of the treaty of Luneville, and by the arrangements which have lately taken place relative to the German indemnities, and to the constitution of the empire, which have been solely guaranteed by some of the principal powers of Europe, but to which his majesty, as king of Great Britain, was no party. Under these circumstances, his majesty has determined, in his character of elector of Hanover, to appeal to the empire, and to those powers of Europe who have guaranteed the Germanic constitution, and thereby his rights and possessions as a prince of that empire. "Until his majesty shall be informed of their sentiments, he has commanded me to say, that in his character of elector of Hanover, he will scrupulously abstain from doing any act which can be considered as being in contravention to the stipulations contained in the convention that was concluded on the 3d of June, between the deputies appointed by the regency of Hanover and the French government. "I desire you to accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c., &c. HAWKESBURY." But this reply did not correspond with the expectations of the first consul, who, doubtless, calculated upon his majesty’s unqualified refusal to sanction the convention of Suhlingen, and consequently, upon being provided with a pretext for declaring it invalid; he, therefore, had recourse to the expedient of misinterpreting the expressions contained in lord Hawkesbury’s reply, and general Mortier, having previously put his troops in motion for the Elbe, made requisitions of boats, and commenced planting batteries on that river, thus proclaimed this new ground of proceeding. "EDOUARD MORTIER, lieutenant-general, &c. à son excellence M. le feld-maréchal comte de WALMODEN, &c. "Armée d’Hanovre, au quartier général à Lüneburg, le 11 messidor, an 11 de la republique Française. "MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, "J’ai eu l’honneur de prévenir votre excellence, que le premier consul approuverait dans son entier la convention de Suhlingen si le roi d’Angleterre consentait lui-même à la ratifier. Il M’est done pénible d’avoir à vous apprendre que lord Hawkesbury a fait connoître au citoyen Talleyrand, minister des rélations extérieurs, que sa majesté brittanique se refusait formellement à cette ratification. "Votre excellence se rappelera qu’en 1757 pareille convention fut conclue à Kloster Zeven, entre M. de Richelieu et le duc de Cumberland; le roi d’Angleterre n’ayant pas voulu y adhérer, donna l’ordre à son armée de recommencer les hostilités. (This was not a parallel case; for the duke of Cumberland’s army was composed of troops in the pay of England, under the command of an English general.) "C’est pour éviter le renouvellement des scènes qui eurent lieu alors, que mon gouvernement me charge de prévenir votre excellence que le refus de sa majesté brittanique rendait nulle la convention de Suhlingen. "Il est évident, M. le maréchal, que l’Angleterre sacrifie indignement vos troupes, dont la bravoure est reconnue de l’Europe entière; mais il n’est pas moins que tout projét de defense de votre part serait illusoire, et ne ferait qu’attirer de nouveaux malheurs sur votre pays. "Je charge le général Berthier, chef de l’étât major général, de vous faire part de mes propositions; je dois insister pour que votre excellence veuille bien me faire dans les vingt-quatre heures une réponse catégorique. "L’armée que j’ai l’honneur de commander, est prête et n’attend que le signal du combat. "Veuillez, M. le Maréchal, recevoir l’assurance de ma consideration distinguée. ED. MORTIER." It is almost unnecessary to observe upon the misrepresentation which this letter contained; but if any doubt could reasonably have existed as to the nature of the king’s intentions respecting the convention of Suhlingen, his majesty’s express orders that the terms of that convention should be strictly observed on the part of the Hanoverian army, which orders were, immediately after the departure of lord Hawkesbury’s reply, transmitted to marshal Wallmoden and the ministry in Lauenburg, sufficiently proved the false and unworthy light in which the crooked policy of the French usurper had placed the upright intention of the British monarch. General Berthier, who was the bearer of the above communication, submitted to marshal Wallmoden at the same time the following programme for a new convention:
A deputation from the electoral provinces (Messrs. von Lenthe and Wangenheim) had already prepared marshal Wallmoden for the appearance of such conditions as this document contained; and having, at the same time, in the name of their whole body, energetically besought him to employ every means of averting the total ruin with which the country was threatened, he felt that he could not, with due regard to the sentiments of the representative body, send a specific reply without first taking the opinion of the general officers of his own army on the new terms, to which he was called upon to consent. He, therefore, answered general Mortier’s letter to that effect; but at once stated, verbally, to the bearer of the communication, that he would never consent to the troops being taken to France; with which assurance general Berthier departed. Twenty-four hours were given to marshal Wallmoden to send in a categorical reply, and in the mean time head-quarters having been removed to Gülzow, he requested that the generals of his army would assemble at that village on the morning of the 1st of July. Mortier’s communication having been laid before this body, its demands were, without a dissentient voice, declared inadmissible; and Wallmoden now gladly beheld his line of conduct simplified to the employment of those vigorous and decided measures which had been long and anxiously desired by his troops. The position occupied by the Hanoverian army in Lauenburg possessed great natural advantages. The broad Elbe, overhung by steep and commanding heights, defended the front; the rivers Stecknitz and Bille ran along the flanks; and these were further protected, on the one side by the neutral territory of Mecklenburg, and on the other by those of Hamburgh and Denmark. With a corps of thirty thousand men, this position could doubtless have been made most formidable; but the small number and impaired condition of the Hanoverian army rendered them unable to derive the full benefit of it locality. The effective force now under the command of the marshal, consisted of two thousand sabres, seven thousand bayonets, fifty three-pounder amusettes, being the regimental guns, and a few howitzers, which, as pièces d’honneur, the French general had allowed him to retain. For the service of this force only two day’s ammunition was at hand, and any stores which might by possibility have been obtained from Hamburg and Lübeck, could not arrive in time to supply the immediate deficiency which hostilities protracted beyond that period would necessarily cause. Although so defective in artillery and ammunition, the inferiority in number of Wallmoden’s force as compared with that of his opponent, was not considerable. Mortier had not, it has been generally believed, more than twelve or thirteen thousand men under his command; but them the French general had adroitly possessed himself of the means of conveying these troops to the opposite side of the Elbe; he was also far superior in artillery, and an army of reserve, under general Dessoles, was reported to be in march to his assistance. Still the result of the council of war was received throughout the army with general feelings of satisfaction, and the contest which appeared now inevitable was anxiously but fearlessly awaited. These expectations were, however, soon destroyed; for before colonel von bock had communicated to general Mortier the decision of the council of war, less humiliating terms were proposed to Wallmoden, through the medium of the deputies von Lenthe and Wangenheim; on the morning of the 3d these were again modified, and the following conditions were finally forwarded to the Hanoverian head-quarters by lieutenant-colonel von bock, as those on which general Mortier proposed to conclude a new convention.
Although much more favourable than either of the preceding propositions, more so indeed than those that were eventually acceded to, the dissolution of the Hanoverian army still forming the basis of the demand, Wallmoden persisted in refusing assent to any terms of which this condition formed a part. He, therefore, answered general Mortier to that effect; but wishing, at the same time, to shew his willingness to meet the views of the French general, suggested to him the sufficient security which the return home of those men who had lately been called in, the delivering of hostages, or other individual and definite security, would give to his government, without the total dismemberment of the Hanoverian army. Either this reply was not considered by general Mortier sufficiently explicit, or the French commander was willing to give marshal Wallmoden more time to consider the subject; for colonel von Bock, to whom the letter was entrusted, had already been some time absent, when a French officer, bearing a flag of truce, appeared at the outposts, and having been conducted to the Hanoverian head-quarters, laid the following note before marshal Wallmoden. "Quartier-general à Lüneburg le 14 Messidor an 11 (3dt July, 1803.) "Le lieutenant-général Mortier a l’honneur de saluer le maréchal de Walmoden. Il le prie de vouloir bien lui faire connoître si son excellence a pris une décision relativement aux dernières propositions, qu’il a eu l’honneur de lui communiquer. "Le general Mortier prie Mons. le Maréchal de recevoir," &c. To this Wallmoden briefly replied by referring general Mortier to his last letter, adding, that it was impossible for him to accept, without some alteration, the conditions which had been proposed, both his reasons and regret at which, he thought he had fully explained in his reply. A crisis in the negotiation appeared now to have again arrived, and the departure of the French officer who was the bearer of the last note, produced a general conviction in the Hanoverian army that the following day would open upon a desperate conflict. Marshal Wallmoden shared in this opinion, and accordingly gave orders that the head-quarter baggage should be ready to move off, and his own horses to be mounted at an hour’s notice; he recommended his officers to take a few hours’ rest in their clothes, and laid down himself alike prepared to answer the demands upon his exertions which an attack of the enemy would, he fully expected, soon render necessary.
from: History of the King's German Legion, Volume 1, London 1832 - 1837, Pages 31 - 48 © 2003 Michael-Andreas Tänzer |
